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Variational quantum algorithms (VQAs) have been considered to be useful applications of noisy
intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) devices. Typically, in the VQAs, a parametrized ansatz circuit
is used to generate a trial wave function, and the parameters are optimized to minimize a cost
function. On the other hand, blind quantum computing (BQC) has been studied in order to provide
the quantum algorithm with security by using cloud networks. A client with a limited ability to
perform quantum operations hopes to have access to a quantum computer of a server, and BQC
allows the client to use the server’s computer without leakage of the client’s information (such as
input, running quantum algorithms, and output) to the server. However, BQC is designed for fault-
tolerant quantum computing, and this requires many ancillary qubits, which may not be suitable for
NISQ devices. Here, we propose an efficient way to implement the NISQ computing with guaranteed
security for the client. In our architecture, only N +1 qubits are required, under an assumption that
the form of ansatzes is known to the server, where N denotes the necessary number of the qubits in
the original NISQ algorithms. The client only performs single-qubit measurements on an ancillary
qubit sent from the server, and the measurement angles can specify the parameters for the ansatzes
of the NISQ algorithms. No-signaling principle guarantees that neither parameters chosen by the
client nor the outputs of the algorithm are leaked to the server. This work paves the way for new
applications of NISQ devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum devices have the potential to offer signifi-
cant advantages over classical devices. Entanglement
and superposition play an essential role in the quan-
tum advantage. Especially, quantum computation, quan-
tum cryptography, and quantum metrology are consid-
ered promising applications of quantum devices [1–19].
Quantum computation provides faster calculations than
the classical one [1–4]. Quantum cryptography ensures
information-theoretic security for the communication be-
tween distant sites [5–7]. Quantum metrology aims to
create a superior sensor to a classical one by using entan-
glement [11–19].
Recently, great efforts have been devoted to the hy-
bridization between quantum computation, quantum
cryptography, and quantum metrology [20–30]. A tech-
nique of quantum computation such as error correction
or phase estimation algorithm has been used in quantum
sensing to improve sensitivity [20–25] and/or dynamic
range [26, 27]. Quantum network can be combined with
quantum sensing to detect global information of the tar-
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get fields [28–30], and to add security about the sensing
target [31–36].
Especially, blind quantum computation (BQC) is an
idea to combine quantum computation and quantum
cryptography [37–41]. Suppose that a client who does
not have a sophisticated quantum device hopes to access
a server that has a scalable fault-tolerant quantum com-
puter. The BQC provides a client with a way to access
the server’s quantum computer in a secure way where
the client’s information such as input, output, and algo-
rithm is not leaked to the server. The key idea of the
BQC is to use measurement-based quantum computa-
tion (MBQC)[42–44]. In the MBQC, a cluster state is
generated as a resource of the entanglement, and then
a sequence of single-qubit measurements is performed.
Depending on the algorithm, one needs to change angles
of the single-qubit measurements, while the form of the
cluster state does not depend on the choice of the algo-
rithm. If the server sends a cluster state to the client
and the client performs the single-qubit measurements,
the server does not obtain any information of either the
details or output of the algorithm set by the client. The
no-signaling principle guarantees the security of the pro-
tocol [45, 46].
Recently many theoretical and experimental works
have been devoted to developing quantum devices in the
noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) era. The NISQ
device could involve tens to thousands of qubits with a
gate error rate of around 10−3 [47]. The NISQ com-
























ment quantum algorithms. Variational quantum algo-
rithms (VQAs) are the typical application of the NISQ
computing [48–54]. In the VQA, one generates a trial
wave function from a parametrized ansatz circuit that is
typically shallow. In order to optimize a cost function
tailored to a problem, one updates the parameters with
classical computation to generate a new trial wave func-
tion. One can search exponentially large Hilbert space
with the parametzied quantum circuit via the repetition
of such hybrid quantum-classical operations, and thus
could find a solution to a given problem.
A natural question is whether one can implement
the NISQ computing in the blind architecture. If one
adopts the BQC with the MBQC, one can in principle
perform any gate-type quantum computation including
NISQ computing. However, to implement the BQC with
the MBQC on the cluster state, the necessary number of
the qubits is around 3N [42–44], where N is the number
of the qubits required in the original NISQ algorithm.
Since the number of the qubits in the blind architecture
with the MBQC is much larger than that in the orig-
inal algorithm without blind properties [37–41], such a
scheme may not be implementable with the NISQ device
with a limited number of qubits.
Here, we propose an efficient scheme to implement the
variational secure cloud quantum computing. The pur-
pose of our scheme is that the client accesses the quantum
computer of the server to implement the NISQ comput-
ing in a secure way where the information of the ansatz
circuit’s parameters and output of the algorithm are not
leaked to the server. This is essential for security, be-
cause the ansatz circuit’s parameters could contain im-
portant information such as private data especially when
we perform machine learning with NISQ devices [55–59].
Importantly, our scheme requires only N+1 qubits while
MBQC on the cluster state requires around 3N qubits.
The key idea of our scheme is to use an ancillary qubit
for the implementation of the quantum gates on regis-
ter qubits of the server. The server performs only a
limited set of gate operations with fixed angles, namely,
Hadamard operations and controlled-Z gates on the reg-
ister qubits, while the client performs arbitrary single-
qubit measurements on the ancillary qubit.
A key idea of our scheme is the use of ancilla-driven
quantum computation (ADQC) [60–63]. The ADQC was
originally discussed as one of the novel ways to perform
the gate-type quantum computation. We discuss, for the
first time to our best knowledge, the use of the ancilla-
driven architecture for NISQ computing with security in-
built. In our architecture, the server couples an ancillary
qubit to a register qubit via a fixed two-qubit gate at the
server side, and the ancillary qubit is sent to the client.
Then the client implements single-qubit measurements
on the ancillary qubit. By repeating this process, the
client can specify the parameters for the NISQ comput-
ing by the angles of the single-qubit measurements, and
also can obtain the output of the algorithm from the read-
out of the ancillary qubit. Importantly, in this scheme,
the client does not send any qubits nor classical signals
to the server, and thus both client’s operations and mea-
surement results are unknown to the server. Therefore,
the information about the parameters and output of the
NISQ algorithm cannot be leaked to the server due to
the no-signaling principle [45, 46].
The paper is structured as follows. In Secs. II and III,
we review the ADQC and NISQ algorithm, respectively.
In Sec. IV, we describe our architecture of the NISQ




In the ADQC [60], we define register qubits to execute
algorithms, and also define an ancillary qubit that can
be spatially transferred from one place to another. The
basic idea of the ADQC is to entangle the register qubit
and ancillary qubit, and the ancillary qubit is sent to
another place for the measurement at a specific angle.
These operations allow one to perform a universal set
of operations. For the implementation with the physical
systems, register qubits can be solid-state systems that
can interact with photons, and the ancillary qubit can be
an optical photon that is transmitted to a distant place.
A. Single-qubit rotation on a register qubit
We explain a realization of single-qubit rotation along
z-axis as follows (see Fig. 1).
1. We prepare a state |+〉A ≡
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) of an an-
cilla qubit (which we call qubit A) and any state
|ψ〉 of register qubits (which we call qubits R).
2. The ancillary qubit A is coupled with one of the reg-
ister qubits R via a controlled-Z gate CZAR, and
subsequently, we implement two Hadamard gates
HA and HR to the qubit A and the qubit R, re-
spectively. Thus, we have a unitary operation of
EAR ≡ HAHRCZAR.
3. A rotation about the z-axis Rz(β) and a Hadamard
gate are implemented on the ancillary qubit, where
β is an arbitrary rotation angle.
4. Measuring the ancillary qubit in the z-basis
projects the state of the register qubit onto
XjAHRRz(β) |ψ〉, where jA = 0 or 1 is the result
of the measurement on the ancillary qubit.
The third and the last steps can be unified into a sin-
gle measurement step if an arbitrary-angle single-qubit
measurement can be implemented on the ancillary qubit.
The details of performing an arbitrary single-qubit rota-






FIG. 1: The circuit for implementing the ancilla-driven
quantum computation (ADQC). The upper horizon-
tal lines (the lower line) represents register qubits (an
ancillary qubit), where CZAR denotes the controlled-Z
gate between one of the register qubits and the ancil-
lary qubit, HR (HA) denotes the Hadamard gate for
the register (ancillary) qubit, and Rz(β) denotes a pa-
rameterized rotation around the z-axis with any value
β. We prepare the initial states |ψ〉 and |+〉A for the
register qubits and the ancillary qubit, respectively,
where |ψ〉 denotes an arbitrary input state. After im-
plementing the unitary operation HARz(β)EAR and
measuring the ancillary qubit in the z-basis, where
EAR ≡ HAHRCZAR, we obtain XjAHRRz(β) |ψ〉 at
the register qubits, where X denotes the Pauli-X gate
and jA = 0 or 1 is the result of the measurement.
III. VARIATIONAL QUANTUM ALGORITHM
FOR NISQ DEVICE
Variational quantum algorithm (VQAs) perform a re-
quired task by preparing a parametrized wave function
on a quantum circuit |ψ(~θ)〉 with the variational pa-
rameters ~θ to be optimized by minimizing a cost func-
tion C(~θ) tailored to a problem. The parametrized
wavefunction can be generally described as |ψ(~θ)〉 =
UAN(~θ) |0̄〉 with |0̄〉 ≡
⊗N
i=1 |0〉, where the ansatz quan-
tum circuit is represented as a repetition of parametrized
quantum gates and fixed quantum gates as UAN(~θ) =
VL+1UL(θL)VLUL−1(θL−1)...U1(θ1)V1. Here, L is the
number of parameters, Uk(θk) and Vk are the k-th
parametrized and fixed gates, respectively, and θk is the
k-th component of the parameter set ~θ. As an example
of the cost function, in the celebrated variational quan-
tum eigensolver (VQE) [48, 51], one uses the expectation
value of the Hamiltonian H, i.e., 〈ψ(~θ)|H |ψ(~θ)〉. Typi-
cally, the parameters at (j+1)-th step ~θ[j+1] is obtained
by optimizing the cost function at the j-th step C(~θ[j]) by
using e.g., gradient descent methods. The total number
of iteration steps to update the parameters is defined as
M . The other example of VQAs is variational quantum
simulation (VQS), which is used to simulate quantum dy-
namics such as Schrödinger equation [53, 54]. By using
the variational principles, it is possible to minimize the
distance between the ideal state in the exact evolution
and the parametrized trial state, which provides us with
the feasible update rule of parameters.
In variational algorithms, we should implement
not only the original quantum circuit but also vari-
ant types of the original circuit. For example, in




are used. They are generated
from a different quantum circuit from the original
ansatz circuit. To discuss these cases in a gen-
eral form, we denote the set of variational quantum














where G is the number of variational quantum circuits
including the original and variants. Accordingly, we
denote the set of the observables measured in these
quantum circuits as {Â(i)1 , Â
(i)




Â(i) is a Pauli matrix (or an operator made up of tensor
products of the Pauli matrices) and K(i) is the number of
observables measured in the i-th quantum circuits. We
will use these notation throughout this paper. We show
a prescription about how to implement the conventional
variational algorithms with these notation in Appendix
B.
IV. VARIATIONAL SECURE CLOUD
QUANTUM COMPUTING
We explain our protocol of the variational secure cloud
quantum computing. Suppose that a client who has the
ability to perform only single-qubit measurements hopes
to access the NISQ computer of the server in a secure
way. The main purpose of our scheme is to hide the in-
formation of the ansatz parameters ~θ set by the client
and output of the algorithm. In our scheme, the ansatz
circuit to be implemented by the server is publicly an-
nounced beforehand. Our scheme is efficient for the NISQ
device that has a limited resource, because our scheme
requires only a single ancillary qubit independently of the
number of qubits needed in the original NISQ algorithm.
These are in stark contrast with the original BQC. In the
BQC, every information of the choice of the client is hid-
den [37–41], while 3N qubits are approximately required
to execute an algorithm using N qubits.
Throughout our paper, we assume that the client has
his/her own private space, and any information in the pri-
vate space is not leaked to the outside. This is the stan-
dard assumption in the quantum key distribution [64]
The key of our protocol is to use the concept of the
ADQC when the server runs the NISQ computing algo-
rithm. We assume that the server has register qubits,
and an ancillary qubit can be sent from the server to the
client. When the server needs to implement a single-qubit
operation based on the ansatz, the server uses the single-
qubit rotation scheme of the ADQC as shown in Fig. 2.
More specifically, the server performs a two-qubit gate
EAR between the register qubit (that we want to per-
form the single-qubit rotation) and the ancillary qubit,
and sends the client the ancillary qubit to be measured
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by the client side. The angle and axis of the single-qubit
rotation are determined by the client. With three sets
of the rotation, an arbitrary single-qubit rotation can be
achieved in a register qubit (see Appendix A).
Moreover, by performing a single-qubit rotation on ev-
ery register qubit in this way, we have byproduct opera-
tors of Xj1+j3Zj2 on every register qubit as shown in Eq.
(A1). It is known that, when Pauli matrices or an iden-
tity operator are randomly implemented on a quantum
state (see Sec. 8.3.4 in Ref. [65]), the state becomes com-
pletely mixed. This means that the byproduct operators
make the state completely mixed for the server. Due to
this property, any measurements on the server side pro-
vide random outcomes if the server side does not have
any information of the client’s dataset, which is helpful
for the client to hide the output of the algorithm. The
security of our scheme can be also interpreted as follows.
During the implementations of these gates in our scheme,
the gate operations executed by the server do not depend
on the ansatz parameters. Moreover, the client does not
send any information to the server during our protocol.
Therefore, the server cannot find the parameters of the
ansatz circuit set by the client. Such security is guaran-
teed by the no-signaling principle [45, 46].
When the server needs to perform a two-qubit gate
based on the ansatz with a specific angle, we adopt a
quantum circuit shown in Fig. 3a. The point is that
an arbitrary two-qubit gate can be decomposed by ar-
bitrary single-qubit gates and controlled-Z gates. We
combine the single-qubit rotations in the ADQC with
two controlled-Z gates as shown in Fig. 3b. In this case,
the angles of the two-qubit gates can be determined by
the client because the angle of the single-qubit gate can
be specified just by the client. Similar to the case of the
single-qubit gates, the no-signaling principle guarantees
that the server does not obtain any information about
the ansatz parameters during the implementation of the
two-qubit gates.
The combinations of the single-qubit gates and two-
qubit gates in our architecture are shown in Fig. 4. The
server performs only Hadamard gates, phase gates, and
controlled-Z gates, which are clifford gates. Therefore,
when the server measures the observables in the register
qubits and sends the measurement results to the client,
the client can effectively remove the effect of the byprod-
uct operators by changing the interpretation of the mea-
surement results (see Appendix A).
Before the client performs the secure cloud NISQ
computation, the server publicly announces the set of
unitary operators {U (i)AN}Gi=1, the set of the observ-
ables {Â(i)1 , Â
(i)
2 , · · · , Â
(i)
K(i)
}Gi=1, the repetition numbers
{N (i)}Gi=1 for sampling with the quantum circuits, initial
states {|ψ(i)(~θ[0])〉}Gi=1, L (the number of variational pa-
rameters), M (the total number of iteration steps for
VQAs), and G (the number of variants of variational
quantum circuits), as shown in Fig. 5.






FIG. 2: A quantum circuit to implement a single-qubit
rotation by the client in our scheme. The circuit is the
same as that in Fig. 1. Firstly, the server entangles one
register qubit with an ancillary qubit by the unitary
operation EAR = HAHRCZAR. Secondly, the server
sends the ancillary qubit to the client. Thirdly, the
client performs a single-qubit rotation of HARz(β) on
the ancillary qubit, where β is determined only by the
client. Finally, after the client measures the ancillary
qubit in the z-basis, XjAHRRz(β) |ψ〉 is generated for
the register qubit. Since the client does not send any
signals to the server, the server does not have any infor-
mation about the rotation angle β and a measurement
result jA, which is guaranteed by the no-signaling prin-
ciple. By repeating this process several times, arbitrary
single-qubit rotations on a register qubit can be imple-
mented.
1. Adopting the quantum circuits of {U (i)AN}Gi=1, the
server and client implement these unitary op-
erations to generate the trial wave functions
{|ψ(i)(~θ[1])〉}Gi=1. Here, parametrized single- and
two-qubit gates should be implemented in the spe-
cific ways as described in Figs. 2 and 3b, respec-
tively. More specifically, the server performs op-
erations, such as the Hadamard, the controlled-Z,
and the phase gates (1.a in Fig. 6), while the client
specifies the measurement angles (1.b of Fig. 6).
We do not need to prepare {|ψ(i)(~θ[1])〉}Gi=1 simul-
taneously by using G quantum computers, but we
can prepare and measure these in sequence by using
a single quantum computer, similar to the standard
VQA for NISQ devices (see Appendix B).
2. The server measures the states of the register qubits
with {Â(i)1 , Â
(i)
2 , · · · , Â
(i)
K(i)
}Gi=1, and sends the re-
sults to the client with classical communications.
3. For the sampling, the server and client repeat
the first and the second steps with {N (i)}Gi=1
times for each state {|ψ(i)(~θ[1])〉}Gi=1 so that
the client should obtain the expectation values of
{Â(i)1 , Â
(i)
2 , · · · , Â
(i)
K(i)
}Gi=1. When the observables
are measured, the effect of the byproduct operators
can be canceled out by the client (see Appendix A).








FIG. 3: An implementation of two-qubit gates in our
scheme. (a) An equivalent circuit with a controlled-gate
operation. We can decompose an arbitrary two-qubit
gate into several gates such as single-qubit rotations
(including parameters) and controlled-Z gates, where
we need to choose appropriate parameters of α, β, γ,
and δ for the equivalence. (b) A quantum circuit to
implement an arbitrary controlled-gate operation by
the client while the rotation parameters are hidden to
the server in our scheme. The basic structure of the
circuit is the same as that in (a), where S denotes a
phase gate. The Hadamard, the controlled-Z, and the
phase gates are implemented by the server in the reg-
ister qubits. An important point is that every single-
qubit rotation in the circuit should be performed by the
client in the same way as described in Fig. 2. In this
case, no-signaling principle guarantees that the rotation
parameters (α, β, γ, and δ) cannot be inferred by any
operation on the server.
classical computer at the client side, the client
updates the parameters and obtains ~θ[2] =
(θ1[2], · · · , θL[2])T for the next step.
5. The client and the server repeat the steps 1-4 (M−
2) times with {U (i)AN}Gi=1 and ~θ[j], where classical
computation based on the results at the j-th step
provides the client with the updated parameters of
~θ[j + 1] for j = 2, 3, · · · ,M − 1. The client finally
obtains desired results in a secure way from the
server.
As a physical implementation, the register qubits can
be the solid-state systems that interact with a photon,
and the ancillary qubit can be an optical photon that
transmits to a distant place. We implicitly assumed that
the photon loss would be negligible during the transmis-
sion in the discussion above.
Finally, we discuss the effect of photon loss on our
scheme. When the server sends the client an ancillary
qubit that corresponds to an optical photon, there is a
possibility that the photon can be lost during the trans-
mission. In principle, if the server and the client have
quantum memories, they can share a Bell pair under the
effect of photon loss by repeating the entanglement gen-
eration process until success [66], and they can use the
Bell pairs to perform our gate operations in a determin-
istic way. In this case, the client needs to ask the server
to send the photons again and again, depending on how
many times the photon is lost [66]. However, in order to
apply the no-signaling principle, the client is not allowed
to send the server any information. This means that the
client cannot ask the server to send the photon again. So
we cannot adopt the repeat-until-success strategy with
quantum memories.
Thus, we assume that the client adopts the observa-
tion results of the readout of the register qubits by the
server only when all photons are successfully transmit-
ted to the client during the computation. In this case,
the probability of the no photon loss during the compu-
tation exponentially decreases as the number of sending
photons increases. The number of required photons sent
to the client can be determined by the number of the
tunable parameters used in the ansatz circuit. When
U
(i)
AN is composed of n
(i)
single single-qubit operations and
n
(i)
two = L − n
(i)
single two-qubit operations, the necessary
number N
(i)







two as shown in Eq. A1 and Figs. 2 and
3b. The probability for all the photons to be detected by
the client is (1 − ploss)N
(i)
ph , where ploss is a photon loss
probability for a single transmission. Therefore, the rep-
etition number N (i) with the photon loss should be set to





ph , where N
(i)
ideal
denotes the required number of repetition with no pho-
ton loss. To keep N (i) within a reasonable amount, ploss
should be smaller than 1% under the assumption that
N
(i)
ph is around a few hundreds.
We could overcome such a problem due to the recent
experimental and theoretical developments of quantum
repeating technology. The best single-photon detector in
optics has 99% efficiency [67–69]. Microwave quantum
repeater with a short distance such as 100 m has been
proposed [70], and a qubit can catch a microwave pho-
ton with 99.4% absorption efficiency in the microwave
regime [71]. Also, there are proposals to physically move
the solid-state qubit [72, 73] for distributed quantum
computation or a quantum repeater Through the combi-
nation of these protocols and a long-lived quantum mem-
ory such as a nuclear spin [74, 75], the ancillary solid-
state qubits might be carried to the client without the




FIG. 4: A quantum circuit to implement our variational secure cloud quantum computing. The NISQ algorithm
requires the parameters {θj}Lj=1 to change the ansatz circuit in a variational way. The server implements gate op-
erations that do not depend on the parameters, and sends the ancillary qubit to the client. On the other hand, the
client can specify the parameters by changing the measurement angles on the ancillary qubits sent from the server.
Importantly, in our scheme, the client does not send any signal to the server, and thus the server does not know the







FIG. 5: Before the client starts the protocol, the
server broadcasts the information about their
quantum circuit. This includes the set of unitary
operations {U (i)AN}Gi=1, the set of the observables
{Â(i)1 , Â
(i)
2 , · · · , Â
(i)
K(i)
}Gi=1 to be measured, the repeti-
tion numbers {N (i)}Gi=1 for the quantum circuits, initial
states {|ψ(i)(~θ[0])〉}Gi=1, and the total number M of iter-
ation steps to update the parameters. The client imple-
ments the NISQ algorithm based on this information.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we proposed a noisy intermediate-scale
quantum (NISQ) computing with security inbuilt. The
main targets of our scheme are variational quantum al-
gorithms (VQAs), which involve parameters of an ansatz
to be optimized by minimizing a cost function. We con-
sidered a circumstance that a client with a limited abil-
ity to perform quantum operations hopes to access a
NISQ device possessed by a server and the client tries
to avoid leakage of the information about the quantum
algorithm that he/she runs. Importantly, the naive ap-
plication of the previously known blind quantum com-
putation (BQC) [46] requires around 3N qubits [42–44],
where N denotes the number of the qubits to run the
quantum algorithm in the original architecture. That
may not be suitable for the NISQ devices with the lim-
ited number of qubits. Our proposal is more efficient in
the sense that we use a single ancillary qubit and N reg-
ister qubits required in the original NISQ algorithm. In
VQAs, we use a parametrized trial wave function, and
our scheme prevents the information about the param-
eters from the leakage to the server. We rely on the
no-signaling principle to guarantee security. Our scheme
paves the way for new applications of the NISQ devices.
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FIG. 6: The sequence of our scheme to implement a NISQ algorithm with a parameter set of ~θ in a variational
secure cloud quantum computing. (1) The server sequentially performs the unitary operations {U (i)AN}Gi=1 for the
register qubits, where G denotes the number of the quantum circuits to be performed. (1.a) The server imple-
ments a unitary (non-parameterized) operation V
(i)
n for n = 1, 2, · · · , L + 1; a Hadamard or a controlled-Z, or a
phase gate, on the register qubits. (1.b) The server entangles a register qubit with an ancillary qubit and sends
the ancillary qubit to the client in the same way as Fig. 2. The client measures the ancillary qubit sent from the





2 , · · · , and Â
(i)
K(i)
for i = 1, 2, · · · , G and sends the results to the client by the classical communication. (3)
For each {U (i)AN}Gi=1, the server and the client repeat these two steps {N (i)}Gi=1 times, and then the client obtains ex-
pectation values of {Â(i)1 , Â
(i)
2 , · · · , Â
(i)
K(i)
}Gi=1 with {|ψ(i)(~θ[1])〉}Gi=1. (4) The client updates the parameters as ~θ[2]
by processing the measurement data with classical computation. (5) The server and the client repeat these four
steps with M − 2 times updating the parameters from ~θ[j] to ~θ[j + 1] for j = 2, 3, · · · ,M − 1, and the client ob-
tains the output. Since the client does not send any signals to the server during the computation, the server cannot
obtain any information about ~θ[1], ~θ[2], . . . , ~θ[M ], because of the no-signaling principle.
Appendix A: Detailed ancilla-driven quantum
computation
1. Arbitrary single-qubit rotation
We describe a way to implement an arbitrary single-
qubit rotation. Any single-qubit rotation U can be
represented by U = Rz(β
′)Rx(γ
′)Rz(δ
′), where Rx de-
notes a rotation about the x-axis, and β′, γ′, and δ′ de-
note the rotation angles about the corresponding axis.
Defining J(β) ≡ HRz(β), one can rewrite U as U =
J(β)J(γ)J(δ), where we choose β, γ, and δ to satisfy
Rz(β)Rx(γ)Rz(δ) = HU . As we explained, one can im-
plement the single-qubit rotation of XjHRRz(β) |ψ〉 on
the register qubit by the coupling with an ancillary qubit
and a subsequent measurement. Therefore, three sequen-
tial operations of this type of the single-qubit rotation










where ji denotes the result of the i-th measurement on
the ancillary qubits. For the implementation of this oper-
ation, we change the rotation angle of the ancillary qubit
depending on the previous measurement results. Equa-
tion. (A1) involves the byproduct operator Xj1+j3Zj2 .
However, as long as we measure the qubit in a compu-
tational basis for the readout, the byproduct operators
just flip the measurement result from 0 to 1 or vice versa,
and so we can effectively remove the byproduct operators
from the states by changing the interpretation of the mea-
surement results.
2. Two-qubit gate between the register qubits
We explain a way to perform the controlled-Z gate on
the two register qubits R and R′ in the ADQC. Firstly, we
implement EAR on the ancillary qubit (prepared in the
state |+〉A) and the register qubit R, and subsequently
perform EAR′ on the ancillary qubit and the other regis-
ter qubit R′. Secondly, one measures the ancillary qubit
in the y-basis. These operations are equivalent to the
controlled-Z gate, up to local operations. When we per-
form several single-qubit gates and two-qubit gates, the
byproduct operators are applied as UΣUideal|0〉, where
UΣ denotes the total byproduct operators and Uideal de-
notes the unitary operations that we aim to implement.
Again, when one measures observables of Pauli matrices
(or a tensor product of Pauli matrices), one can effec-
tively remove the byproduct operators from the states by
changing the interpretation of the measurement results.
Appendix B: VQA for NISQ devices
We show a prescription about how to implement
the conventional variational algorithms with our nota-
tion. We prepare a parametrized wave function on
a quantum circuit |ψ(~θ)〉 with the variational param-
eters ~θ to be optimized by minimizing a cost func-
tion C(~θ) tailored to a problem. Firstly, with the
quantum circuits of {U (i)AN}Gi=1, we realize parametrized
wave functions of N -qubits {|ψ(i)(~θ[1])〉}Gi=1, where











i=1 |0〉 denotes the wave function, ~θ[1] =
(θ1[1], · · · , θL[1])T is a vector of the parameters and
{|ψ(i)(~θ[0])〉}Gi=1 are initial states, and we measure the
state of the wave function with observables of {Â(i)1 , Â
(i)
2 ,
· · · , Â(i)
K(i)
}Gi=1.
Secondly, for the sampling, we repeat the first step
to obtain expectation values of {Â(i)1 , Â
(i)




with {|ψ(i)(~θ[1])〉}Gi=1. Thirdly, based on the expectation
values, we implement a classical algorithm so that we can
obtain updated parameters ~θ[2] for the next quantum
circuits, where we typically use a gradient method to
make the cost function smaller. For example, we use
~θ[j + 1] = ~θ[j]− αgradC(~θ[j]) for the gradient method.
Finally, we repeat the first, second, and third steps
M−2 times with {U (i)AN}Gi=1 and ~θ[k], where classical com-
putation based on the results at the k-th step provides
the updated parameters of ~θ[k+1] for k = 2, 3, · · · ,M−1.
These processes provide us with an output of the algo-
rithm.
[1] P. W. Shor, SIAM Journal on Computing 26, 1484
(1997), https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539795293172.
[2] L. K. Grover, Physical review letters 79, 325 (1997).
[3] A. W. Harrow, A. Hassidim, and S. Lloyd, Physical re-
view letters 103, 150502 (2009).
[4] L. M. Vandersypen, M. Steffen, G. Breyta, C. S. Yannoni,
M. H. Sherwood, and I. L. Chuang, Nature 414, 883
(2001).
[5] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Proceedings of the ieee
international conference on computers, systems and sig-
nal processing,” (1984).
[6] C. H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, and
J. Smolin, Journal of cryptology 5, 3 (1992).
[7] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[8] A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons, and E. Kashefi, in 2009
50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Com-
puter Science (2009) pp. 517–526.
[9] J. P. Dowling and G. J. Milburn, Philosophical Trans-
actions of the Royal Society of London. Series A: Math-
ematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 361, 1655
(2003).
[10] T. P. Spiller, W. J. Munro, S. D. Barrett, and
P. Kok, Contemporary Physics 46, 407 (2005),
https://doi.org/10.1080/00107510500293261.
[11] C. L. Degen, F. Reinhard, and P. Cappellaro, Rev. Mod.
Phys. 89, 035002 (2017).
[12] D. Budker and M. Romalis, Nature physics 3, 227 (2007).
[13] G. Balasubramanian, I. Chan, R. Kolesov, M. Al-Hmoud,
J. Tisler, C. Shin, C. Kim, A. Wojcik, P. R. Hemmer,
A. Krueger, et al., Nature 455, 648 (2008).
[14] J. R. Maze, P. L. Stanwix, J. S. Hodges, S. Hong, J. M.
Taylor, P. Cappellaro, L. Jiang, M. G. Dutt, E. Togan,
A. Zibrov, et al., Nature 455, 644 (2008).
[15] P. Neumann, I. Jakobi, F. Dolde, C. Burk, R. Reuter,
G. Waldherr, J. Honert, T. Wolf, A. Brunner, J. H. Shim,
et al., Nano letters 13, 2738 (2013).
[16] D. J. Wineland, J. J. Bollinger, W. M. Itano, F. Moore,
9
and D. Heinzen, Physical Review A 46, R6797 (1992).
[17] S. F. Huelga, C. Macchiavello, T. Pellizzari, A. K. Ekert,
M. B. Plenio, and J. I. Cirac, Physical Review Letters
79, 3865 (1997).
[18] Y. Matsuzaki, S. C. Benjamin, and J. Fitzsimons, Phys-
ical Review A 84, 012103 (2011).
[19] A. W. Chin, S. F. Huelga, and M. B. Plenio, Physical
review letters 109, 233601 (2012).
[20] E. M. Kessler, I. Lovchinsky, A. O. Sushkov, and M. D.
Lukin, Physical review letters 112, 150802 (2014).
[21] W. Dür, M. Skotiniotis, F. Froewis, and B. Kraus, Phys-
ical Review Letters 112, 080801 (2014).
[22] G. Arrad, Y. Vinkler, D. Aharonov, and A. Retzker,
Physical review letters 112, 150801 (2014).
[23] D. A. Herrera-Mart́ı, T. Gefen, D. Aharonov, N. Katz,
and A. Retzker, Physical review letters 115, 200501
(2015).
[24] T. Unden, P. Balasubramanian, D. Louzon, Y. Vinkler,
M. B. Plenio, M. Markham, D. Twitchen, A. Stacey,
I. Lovchinsky, A. O. Sushkov, et al., Physical review let-
ters 116, 230502 (2016).
[25] Y. Matsuzaki and S. Benjamin, Physical Review A 95,
032303 (2017).
[26] B. L. Higgins, D. W. Berry, S. D. Bartlett, H. M. Wise-
man, and G. J. Pryde, Nature 450, 393 (2007).
[27] G. Waldherr, J. Beck, P. Neumann, R. Said, M. Nitsche,
M. Markham, D. Twitchen, J. Twamley, F. Jelezko, and
J. Wrachtrup, Nature nanotechnology 7, 105 (2012).
[28] P. Komar, E. M. Kessler, M. Bishof, L. Jiang, A. S.
Sørensen, J. Ye, and M. D. Lukin, Nature Physics 10,
582 (2014).
[29] T. J. Proctor, P. A. Knott, and J. A. Dunningham,
Physical review letters 120, 080501 (2018).
[30] Z. Eldredge, M. Foss-Feig, J. A. Gross, S. L. Rolston, and
A. V. Gorshkov, Physical Review A 97, 042337 (2018).
[31] V. Giovannetti, S. Lloyd, and L. Maccone, Journal of
Optics B: Quantum and Semiclassical Optics 4, S413
(2002).
[32] V. Giovannetti, S. Lloyd, and L. Maccone, Physical Re-
view A 65, 022309 (2002).
[33] G. Chiribella, L. Maccone, and P. Perinotti, Physical
review letters 98, 120501 (2007).
[34] Z. Huang, C. Macchiavello, and L. Maccone, Physical
Review A 99, 022314 (2019).
[35] Y. Takeuchi, Y. Matsuzaki, K. Miyanishi, T. Sugiyama,
and W. J. Munro, Physical Review A 99, 022325 (2019).
[36] P. Yin, Y. Takeuchi, W.-H. Zhang, Z.-Q. Yin, Y. Mat-
suzaki, X.-X. Peng, X.-Y. Xu, J.-S. Xu, J.-S. Tang, Z.-Q.
Zhou, et al., Physical Review Applied 14, 014065 (2020).
[37] A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons, and E. Kashefi, in 2009
50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Com-
puter Science (IEEE, 2009) pp. 517–526.
[38] T. Morimae and K. Fujii, Phys. Rev. A 87, 050301
(2013).
[39] Y. Takeuchi, K. Fujii, R. Ikuta, T. Yamamoto, and
N. Imoto, Phys. Rev. A 93, 052307 (2016).
[40] S. Barz, E. Kashefi, A. Broadbent, J. F. Fitzsimons,
A. Zeilinger, and P. Walther, Science 335, 303 (2012),
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/335/6066/303.full.pdf.
[41] C. Greganti, M.-C. Roehsner, S. Barz, T. Morimae, and
P. Walther, New Journal of Physics 18, 013020 (2016).
[42] R. Raussendorf and H. J. Briegel, Physical Review Let-
ters 86, 5188 (2001).
[43] R. Raussendorf, D. E. Browne, and H. J. Briegel, Phys-
ical review A 68, 022312 (2003).
[44] P. Walther, K. J. Resch, T. Rudolph, E. Schenck, H. We-
infurter, V. Vedral, M. Aspelmeyer, and A. Zeilinger,
Nature 434, 169 (2005).
[45] S. Popescu and D. Rohrlich, Foundations of Physics 24,
379 (1994).
[46] T. Morimae and K. Fujii, Physical Review A 87, 050301
(2013).
[47] S. Endo, Z. Cai, S. C. Benjamin, and X. Yuan, Journal
of the Physical Society of Japan 90, 032001 (2021).
[48] A. Peruzzo, J. McClean, P. Shadbolt, M.-H. Yung, X.-Q.
Zhou, P. J. Love, A. Aspuru-Guzik, and J. L. O’brien,
Nature communications 5, 1 (2014).
[49] A. Kandala, A. Mezzacapo, K. Temme, M. Takita,
M. Brink, J. M. Chow, and J. M. Gambetta, Nature
549, 242 (2017).
[50] N. Moll, P. Barkoutsos, L. S. Bishop, J. M. Chow,
A. Cross, D. J. Egger, S. Filipp, A. Fuhrer, J. M. Gam-
betta, M. Ganzhorn, et al., Quantum Science and Tech-
nology 3, 030503 (2018).
[51] J. R. McClean, J. Romero, R. Babbush, and A. Aspuru-
Guzik, New Journal of Physics 18, 023023 (2016).
[52] E. Farhi, J. Goldstone, and S. Gutmann, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1411.4028 (2014).
[53] Y. Li and S. C. Benjamin, Physical Review X 7, 021050
(2017).
[54] X. Yuan, S. Endo, Q. Zhao, Y. Li, and S. C. Benjamin,
Quantum 3, 191 (2019).
[55] K. Mitarai, M. Negoro, M. Kitagawa, and K. Fujii, Phys-
ical Review A 98, 032309 (2018).
[56] M. Schuld, A. Bocharov, K. M. Svore, and N. Wiebe,
Physical Review A 101, 032308 (2020).
[57] E. Farhi, H. Neven, et al., Quantum Review Letters 1,
10 (2020).
[58] C. Zoufal, A. Lucchi, and S. Woerner, Quantum Machine
Intelligence 3, 1 (2021).
[59] Y. Shingu, Y. Seki, S. Watabe, S. Endo, Y. Matsuzaki,
S. Kawabata, T. Nikuni, and H. Hakoshima, arXiv
preprint arXiv:2007.00876 (2020).
[60] J. Anders, D. K. Oi, E. Kashefi, D. E. Browne, and
E. Andersson, Physical Review A 82, 020301 (2010).
[61] A. Bocharov, M. Roetteler, and K. M. Svore, Physical
review letters 114, 080502 (2015).
[62] D. Browne and H. Briegel, Quantum Information: From
Foundations to Quantum Technology Applications , 449
(2016).
[63] A. Paetznick and K. M. Svore, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1311.1074 (2013).
[64] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf,
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